| 1 | Define the threat model first | Assets, attackers, trust boundaries, and operational exposure | Document protected assets, physical access assumptions, network exposure, maintenance methods, and consequences of compromise before comparing hardware. | Approved threat model, risk register, data-flow diagram, and security requirements specification. |
| 2 | Require a TPM 2.0 implementation | Hardware-backed key protection and platform identity | Confirm support for TPM 2.0 as specified by ISO/IEC 11889, including secure key storage, random-number generation, PCRs, and device identity functions. | TPM capability report, firmware configuration record, TPM software-stack compatibility test, and attestation demonstration. |
| 3 | Verify Secure Boot and signed updates | Boot-chain integrity and firmware authenticity | The platform should reject unsigned or incorrectly signed firmware, maintain a protected key hierarchy, support authorized key rotation, and prevent rollback to revoked versions. | Secure Boot configuration, signing-policy documentation, failed-signature test results, revocation procedure, and rollback-protection test. |
| 4 | Check measured boot and remote attestation | Proof of software state during startup | Boot measurements should be extended into TPM PCRs and made available to an authorized verifier so that unexpected firmware or configuration changes can be detected. | PCR baseline, event log, attestation quote, verifier policy, and an alert generated from a deliberately modified boot component. |
| 5 | Map the design to IEC 62443 controls | Industrial automation and control-system security | Use IEC 62443-4-1 for secure product development practices and IEC 62443-4-2 for component-level security requirements, with a documented target security level appropriate to the risk. | IEC 62443 requirement matrix, security-level rationale, secure-development lifecycle records, and independent assessment results where applicable. |
| 6 | Evaluate vulnerability and patch support | Product maintenance and vulnerability response | Choose a supplier with a published vulnerability-reporting process, documented security advisories, defined response responsibilities, and a support period suitable for the system lifecycle. | Product security policy, vulnerability disclosure process, update history, end-of-support policy, and sample security advisory. |
| 7 | Protect stored data and credentials | Confidentiality, key management, and storage integrity | Confirm support for encrypted storage, protected credential provisioning, least-privilege access, secure key deletion, and recovery procedures that do not expose secrets. | Encryption architecture, key-lifecycle procedure, provisioning records, access-control matrix, and data-remanence test results. |
| 8 | Assess network and interface hardening | Communication security and attack-surface reduction | Disable unused interfaces, require authenticated and encrypted management access, separate operational networks where appropriate, and restrict services to documented business needs. | Port-and-service inventory, firewall rules, network segmentation diagram, configuration baseline, and vulnerability-scan report. |
| 9 | Test physical tamper resistance | Protection against local or supply-chain access | Evaluate protection of debug ports, boot media, removable storage, console access, and TPM-related secrets under the expected physical-access scenario. | Disabled-debug verification, enclosure and port inspection, tamper-response procedure, manufacturing security controls, and penetration-test findings. |
| 10 | Validate security during lifecycle operations | Provisioning, monitoring, recovery, and decommissioning | Confirm secure factory provisioning, audit logging, time synchronization, incident recovery, configuration backup, certificate renewal, and secure retirement procedures. | Lifecycle security plan, provisioning checklist, log-retention policy, recovery exercise, certificate-renewal test, and secure disposal record. |